Famous Trademarks:  Ordinary Inquiry by the Courts of Marks Entitled to an Extraordinary Remedy by Mahaffey-Dowd, Brendan
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 1 Article 8
1-1-1998
Famous Trademarks: Ordinary Inquiry by the
Courts of Marks Entitled to an Extraordinary
Remedy
Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Famous Trademarks: Ordinary Inquiry by the Courts of Marks Entitled to an Extraordinary Remedy, 64 Brook.
L. Rev. 423 (1998).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol64/iss1/8
FAMOUS TRADEMARKS: ORDINARY INQUIRY BY THE
COURTS OF MARKS ENTITLED TO AN EXTRAORDINARY
REMEDY
I NTRODUCTION
The federal trademark dilution law1 has been hailed as a "pow-
erful tool" trademark owners can use to protect their marks.2 Under
a dilution claim, the owner of a famous trademark alleges either that
the unauthorized use of a similar mark by someone else whittles
away at the distinctiveness of the mark rendering it no longer exclu-
sive or that the unauthorized use tarnishes the good reputation and
quality of the famous mark A successful claim results in nation-
wide injunctive relief for virtually any unauthorized use of a famous
mark.4
Under a traditional trademark infringement or unfair competi-
tion claim, a plaintiff must prove that it owns a registered or dis-
tinctive mark, that the alleged infringer is using an identical or
deceptively similar mark, and that the use of the infringing mark is
likely to cause confusion among consumers as to the origin of the
mark.' Thus, if someone attempted to sell Harry-Davidson motorcy-
cles and Popsi cola,6  Harley-Davidson and Pepsi could file
trademark infringement claims against the junior users.7
i15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
2 See Dominic Bencivenga, Trademark Dilution: Attorneys Long for Guidance on
Proving Erosion, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 3, 1997, at 5; see also Barry M. Krivsky, The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: The In-House Counsel Perspective, 86 TRADEMARK REP.
514 (1996).
1 See Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. V. Salon Sciences Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995,
1997 WL 244746, *4 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
4 See id.
5 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see also Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 779-80 (1992); Gruner Jahr USA Pub. v.
Meridith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1077 (2d Cir. 1993).
6 See Sco-r ADAMS, THE DILBERT PRINCIPLE 135 (1996).
7 A junior user is one who uses the mark after it has already been registered or
made famous. See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 24:72 (4th ed.
1995).
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Dilution gives broader protection than traditional trademark
protection. Unlike traditional trademark protection which requires
unauthorized use of a registered or distinctive mark and consumer
confusion, dilution turns on the attenuation of the exclusivity and
distinctiveness of a mark. This typically occurs when a mark is
employed for a use that is unrelated to that mark's registered pur-
pose.8 For example, dilution protection provides the owners of the
Harley-Davidson and Pepsi trademarks the additional ability to
prevent another party from opening a chain of Harley-Davidson
carwashes or Pepsi sex shops.
Dilution prevents the junior use of a mark even though there is
no source confusion, direct competition or immediate economic
loss. It prohibits the additional use of the mark in other areas that
will, over time, "blur" the distinctiveness of the mark.' If others
opened Pepsi hardware stores and Pepsi gas stations, sold Pepsi
brand tomatoes, Pepsi backpacks and Pepsi sport utility vehicles,
the public would no longer instantly associate Pepsi with the cola
beverage. The money spent by the company to create a unique
identifier with such widespread recognition would be for naught.
Ultimately, its ability to compete with others within its own industry
would be damaged.1"
The federal dilution statute is indicative of a shift in the theoret-
ical basis for trademark protection. Trademark law has historically
served a dual purpose of consumer protection and producer protec-
tion." Early trademark laws prohibited deceptively similar marks
so that consumers would not be confused by cheap imitations. 2
The dilution statute gives the owner of the mark a cause of action
against the infringer even in the absence of consumer confusion. 3
8 See id. (explaining that dilution originally was intended to cover noncompetitive
goods. While state statutes differ on the issue, the Restatement and the new federal
statute take the position that the law should also apply to competitive goods).
9 See Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)("Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by
another's use [of the mark]. This is the essence of dilution."), excerpted in H.R. REP.
No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
"0 See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REv. 813, 832 (1927).
I See JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, HOPKINS ON TRADEMARKS 1-3 (2d ed. 1905).
12 See id.
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(Q (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
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With this statute, consumer protection, the historical underpinning
of trademark law, is no longer an issue. The dilution statute exists
only to protect the value of famous trademarks, not consumers.
Trademark owners sought this extra level of protection because
a prominent trademark is often the most valuable asset of a compa-
ny."4 Owners of famous marks typically spend millions of dollars
to promote the mark and to create an instant association between
that mark and the product in the minds of consumers."5 The
unique qualities and selling power of a particular trademark provide
its value. 6 A distinctive mark that represents a quality product can
be worth billions of dollars which the owner understandably wishes
to protect.17 Because of the significant value trademarks represent,
their owners increasingly view trademarks as valuable intellectual
property rights rather than a means of consumer protection."8
The owners of famous marks argued for dilution protection
since the 1920s.'9 Advocates of federal protection pointed to the
insufficient patchwork of protection from the state laws as a major
reason why a federal statute was necessary.2" Additionally, famous
marks lacked protection "on a nationwide basis."" While enact-
14 Approximately 70% of the net worth of Sara Lee Corporation is its trademarked
brand names. See Jim Kirk, Building Up the Brands, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 5, 1997, at
C1. Sara Lee recently announced that it will follow the lead of such companies as Nike
and Coca-Cola and will divest itself of its tangible assets to concentrate on marketing
the brand names it owns such as Champion, Playtex, Hanes, Hillshire Farm meats,
Coach leather products, L'eggs, and Wonderbra. See id.; see also John Ellis, Leave it to
Wall Street to Dislike Sara Lee, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1997, at A15; Nikki Tait, The
Focus Narrows, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at 13. By divesting itself of its manufacturing
assets, Sara Lee will become a 'virtual company' with its value tied up in its trade-
marks and marketing skills. See Ellis, supra, at A15.
25 Some companies spend billions of dollars each year to promote their marks. Proc-
tor & Gamble has the highest advertising budget, spending $2.6 billion in 1996 to
advertise and promote its marks. See R. Craig Endicott, Leaders Back Brands with $52.1
Billion in Ads, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 29, 1997, at S.3. General Motors and Phillip
Morris were second and third, respectively, at $2.37 billion and $2.28 billion. See id.
16 See Schechter, supra note 10, at 831. Schechter is widely credited as the true
father of the dilution theory.
V The Marlboro mark is valued at $44.6 billion, the Coca-Cola mark is estimated to
be worth over $43 billion, and the McDonald's name is worth nearly $19 billion. See
Kurt Badenhausen, Blind Faith, FIN. WORLD, July 8, 1996, at 50, cited in Robert N.
Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection, 58 U. PIT. L. REV. 789, 791 n.6 (1997).
IS See Bencivenga, supra note 2.
29 See Schechter, supra note 10.
20 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
22 Id. Some state courts were afraid to issue sweeping nationwide injunctions for fear
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ment was largely based on the above reasons, Congress also gave
protection to famous marks to bring United States law into line with
international treaties to which the United States is a signatory.22
Moreover, by providing protection to famous marks at home, the
President would have additional leverage to negotiate protection for
famous American marks abroad.2"
Despite the fact that the federal trademark dilution protection
law is hailed as a "powerful tool," practitioners are uncertain about
its effect. They cite the lack of an easily articulable test to prove
dilution.2 4  Other critics of the law complain that the dilution stat-
ute creates too much uncertainty in the field of trademark law.2"
Before the dilution statute, a search of the availability of a mark for
use involved checking state and federal registries and then looking
for common law uses of the mark within the particular industry for
which usage was sought. A lack of similar marks in the product's
relevant market indicated that the mark probably would not "in-
fringe" on any other mark. Now, practitioners must advise clients
that even if a mark is registered by the Patent and Trademark Office
because it will not infringe on any other marks, the client could still
be sued for dilution.26 Because there is no register of famous
marks, users have less certainty of the availability of their marks.
An additional problem is the growing body of poorly reasoned
precedent in this area by the district courts. Particularly problematic
is the lack of carefully reasoned opinions discussing the determi-
nation of fame. This is troubling in light of the fact that fame is a
threshold issue. Congress intended only a small group of truly fa-
mous marks to be entitled to dilution protection. The courts, how-
ever, have been less than careful, giving protection to undeserving
of violating the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See The United States
Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to
USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 457-58 (1987) [herein-
after TRC Report] (citing Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Serv., 610 F. Supp. 381, 382-83
(N.D. III. 1985)). Though nationally famous marks gained nationwide protection, Con-
gress intended that state laws continue to be invoked to prevent the dilution of locally
famous marks. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1031. The statute explicitly remarks that state statutes are not pre-empted by the
federal law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
22 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1031.
23 See id.
24 See Bencivenga, supra note 2.
2s See Bencivenga, supra note 2; Current Commentary on the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 490, 496 (1997) (comments of J. Thomas McCarthy).
26 See Bencivenga, supra note 2 (comments of Robert Alpert).
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marks. Part I of this Note will trace the history of trademark protec-
tion and the increasing pressure for federal dilution protection. It
will show how the federal dilution statute was intended to be ap-
plied to a narrow range of marks famous on a nationwide basis in
order to carefully balance free and fair competition. Part II of this
Note analyzes each of the factors the dilution statute sets forth for
courts to use to determine if a mark is famous. For each factor, this
Note will examine the application of that factor in the courts. It will
criticize some decisions and suggest better ways for courts to con-
sider certain factors. This Note argues that the poorly reasoned
opinions of the courts determining fame in some instances result in
either the finding of fame where none is warranted or the creation
of bad precedent which may ultimately lead to inconsistent judicial
decision-making. This Note ultimately argues that poorly reasoned
fame determinations threaten to undermine the legislative intent and
create additional uncertainty in the field of trademark law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Infringement
In the United States, trademark protection developed under the
common law until Congress enacted a federal trademark statute in
1870.27 Under the federal law, producers, the ultimate injured par-
ties, could enjoin the use of the infringing mark to prevent the loss
of customers and profits.28 Since a trademark identified the "origin,
ownership, or place of manufacture or sale, ... the producer, or
where it may be purchased," 29 its owner was entitled to relief if
the marks and identifying symbols of a counterfeit caused consum-
ers to believe they were purchasing "the genuine article." °
A trademark did not give the owner an exclusive right to that
name; only when the use of the mark was likely to be associated
with a certain manufacturer of a "particular kind of goods" would
infringement be found. 1 From the early stages of trademark law,
Congress and the courts sought to carefully balance the demands of
7 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 2, tit. 60, §§ 4937-4947, 16 Stat. 198, cited in
Klieger, supra note 17, at 798.
11 See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1877).
29 Id. at 254.
'o Id. at 253.
"' Id. at 252-53.
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fair competition and free competition. While the law sought to
promote fair business practices and to prevent consumers from
being misled, the law was limited to the needs of contemporary
business practices so as to not unnecessarily stifle free competition.
The 1870 law which was enacted by Congress under the patent
and copyright power was declared unconstitutional in 1879.32
Trademark owners, however, were undeterred and continued to
seek federal protection for their marks. Under the Trademark Act of
1905, however, relief could only be obtained for the unauthorized
use of a registered mark on "merchandise of the same descriptive
properties."33 Limiting trademark protection to substantially similar
goods provided statutory protection to registered marks while not
unnecessarily hampering free competition. The statute addressed the
needs of the times. The economy had yet to enter the stage where
numerous corporations were marketing multiple products under the
same mark.34
While some argued for abolishment of the Trademark Act of
1905 because the common law provided an adequate and elastic
remedy for protection,35 others called for more stringent protection
to combat the "progressive ingenuity of commercial depravity."36
Frank Schechter, the original advocate of dilution protection, argued
that protection should not be limited to instances of consumer con-
fusion. 7 He argued that any use of a unique mark by a
noncompetitor, even in the absence of consumer confusion, would
eventually erode its distinctiveness in the field in which it was first
used and harm its ability to compete.38 Additionally, the mark
owner would ultimately lose control of the use of the mark as a
32 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (declaring that Congress exceeded its
power under the Patent and Copyright Clause found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 17
of the Constitution).
" See Trademark Act of 1905, c. 595, 33 Stat. 724, reprinted in HOPKINS, supra
note 11, at 480.
3 See Klieger, supra note 17, at 804.
1s See generally Edward S. Rogers, The Expensive Futility of the United States Trade-
Mark Statute, 12 MICH. L. REv. 660, 662 (1914). Rogers' distaste for the statute went
beyond the conceptual. '[This statute is a slovenly piece of legislation, characterized by
awkward phraseology, bad grammar and involved sentences. Its draftsmen had a talent
for obscurity amounting to genius." Id. at 665.
36 See Schechter, supra note 10, at 813.
7 See Schechter, supra note 10, at 813. Schechter, in addition to being an advo-
cate for stronger trademark laws, was trademark counsel for BVD. See Jerome Gilson, A
Federal Dilution Statute: Is it Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 108, 109 (1993).
" See Schechter, supra note 10, at 831-32.
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symbol of quality, the primary value of a trademark to contempo-
rary consumers and producers.39 Under Schecter's view, the law
would vest the famous trademark owner with an in gross property
right.4" A dilution action would, therefore, become tantamount to
an action for trespass rather than an unfair trade practice action.4
Dilution actions, however, do not prevent all uses, only those uses
of a mark which seek to leech off of the good name established by
the senior mark. Dilution actions, therefore, are more firmly ground-
ed in the law of unfair competition.
In 1946 Congress supplanted the Trademark Act of 1905 with
the Lanham Act.42 The Act provided trademark owners with protec-
tion against the unauthorized use of a mark in connection with "any
goods or services ... [if] such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive" the consumer.43 Additionally, Con-
gress codified unfair competition law, providing a statutory cause of
action for unregistered marks.44 By providing a cause of action for
the unauthorized use of a mark on any good or service, Congress
abolished the language of the 1905 statute which limited protection
to goods with "the same descriptive properties."4" No matter what
product or service the infringing mark promoted, if the public was
confused as to the source origin, the junior user could be enjoined.
Direct competition was no longer necessary, however, consumer
confusion was still the touchstone of an infringement claim.
Although the Lanham Act significantly broadened the protec-
tion of trademark holders, it failed to satisfy those who called for
the more sweeping protection which Schechter advocated. The
11 See Schechter, supra note 10, at 824.
40 See Klieger, supra note 17, at 795.
41 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 456. The problem with the property approach
to the use of a mark is that if the owner ceases to use the mark, see MCCARTHY, supra
note 7, § 17:9, or if it becomes a generic identifier for a product through common use
the trademark ceases to exist. See Illinois High Sch. Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d
244, 247 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (citing the examples of "aspirin" and "thermos" of
trademarks which became generic). Interest in a trademark does not rise to the level of
property right. See id. at 246 (citing Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368
(1924) (Holmes, J.)).
42 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1128 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (providing a cause of action against one who uses "any
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact . . .).
4s See Trademark Act of 1905, c. 592, 33 Stat. 724, reprinted in HOPKINS, supra
note 11, at 480.
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tension in trademark and unfair competition law that existed for
some time over whether the laws were truly consumer protection
measures or whether they vested in the trademark owner a property
right46 continued under the new statute. Consumer confusion was
still a necessity despite the fact that it was the producer who
ultimately was damaged and enforced his right to exclusive use.
B. State Dilution Protection
Although Congress declined to exempt the consumer confusion
requirement from the Lanham Act, dilution gained momentum the
following year with the passage of the first state law protecting
distinctive marks from dilution. 7 Four other states had enacted
dilution statutes by 1964 when the United States Trademark
Association (now the International Trademark Association) adopted
dilution protection into its Model State Trademark Bill ("MSTB").4 8
The MSTB provided that:
[I]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common
law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of
competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the
source of goods or services.49
The passage of the MSTB prompted many states to pass statutes
which in large part adopted similar language. At the time of the pas-
sage of the federal trademark dilution law, at least twenty-six states,
including New York, Illinois, and California, had enacted dilution
statutes.o
C. The Restatement
In 1993, the Restatement included a provision for dilution
protection for the first time."' The Restatement required that the
junior use cause an association between the senior user's mark and
I See Wallace R. Lane, Development of Secondary Rights in Trademark Cases, 18
YALE LJ. 571, 577-78 (1909).
4 See Klieger, supra note 17, at 811.
8 See Klieger, supra note 17, at 812-13.
4 United States Trademark Association Model State Trademark Bill § 12, reprinted in
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:80.
o See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 24:80, 24:129, 24:130.
si See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (1993).
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the junior user's goods.52 The plaintiff then has to prove that the
association between the junior user's goods and the senior user's
mark will either reduce the distinctiveness of the senior user's mark
or tarnish it. 3
D. International Protection
In 1967 famous marks gained protection internationally through
an amendment to the Paris Convention, an international treaty for
the protection of intellectual property. 4 Article 6bis was added to
include protection for famous marks from unauthorized reproduc-
tions which are likely to cause confusion with the well-known
mark.5 Under the Convention, however, a "well-known" mark is
not defined. It is explicitly left to the member nations to each define
the criteria of well-known marks.56 Although case law remains split
on the issue, generally, federal courts have held that the Paris
Convention is not a self-executing treaty; as such, it requires federal
legislation to implement its provisions.57 Thus, although the Paris
Convention gave infringement protection to well-known marks, the
absence of federal legislation clearly defining what constituted a
well-known mark left Article 6bis unenforceable in the United
States.
In 1994 the Trade Related Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") por-
tions of General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was
passed into law in the United States.58 TRIPS explicitly adopted
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. 9 To assist in determining
whether a mark is well-known, TRIPS provided that "knowledge...
in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in that
member obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark]"
should be considered.6' Additionally, Article 16(3) of TRIPS includ-
52 See id. § 25(1) (if the actor uses such a designation in a manner that is likely to
associate the other's mark with the goods, services, or business of the actor ... .
See id. § 25(1)(a), (b).
See Frederick W. Mostert, Well-Known and Famous Marks: Is Harmony Possible in
the Global Village?, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 107 (1996). The United States is a member
of the Paris Convention. See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 29:25.
5' See Mostert, supra note 54, at 107.
See Paris Convention, Art. 6bis(l), reprinted in Mostert, supra note 54, at 107.
57 See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 29:33.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 29:36.
5' See Mostert, supra note 54, at 108.
60 See Mostert, supra note 54, at 108.
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ed dilution protection for well-known marks.' TRIPS provided a
starting point for the criteria of a well-known mark. However,
additional legislation was still required to flesh out the definition.62
As dilution protection made inroads at both the state and inter-
national levels, advocates continued to push for federal protection
for a number of reasons. First, judges often limited injunctive relief
to the state where the dilution occurred, creating an insufficient
patchwork of protection. 3 Second, courts frequently applied dilu-
tion standards inconsistently. 4 By the end of 1996, only sixteen
cases were successful solely on state dilution grounds.65 Third, the
lack of federal protection was inconsistent with the United States'
obligations under international treaties. Finally, while legislation
enacting TRIPS gave special protection to well-known marks, the
U.S. Congress had yet to define what it considered a "well-known
mark. 66
E. The Federal Dilution Statute
Dilution advocates finally obtained the protection they had
long sought in 1996 with the passage of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995. The statute provides that
[t]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunc-
tion against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain other
relief as is provided in this subsection."
6! See Mostert, supra note 54, at 108.
62 The United States also belongs to the Inter-American Convention for Trademark
and Commercial Protection with thirteen other Latin American nations. See McCARTHY,
supra note 7, § 29:26 n.1. In addition to multilateral arrangements, the United States
signed bilateral treaties with China, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan and Taiwan. See id.
63 See H.R. REP. No. 104-370, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
See id.
65 See Klieger, supra note 17, at 820 (citations omitted). Ironically, the House Report
to the federal bill stated that the federal definition of dilution "is designed to encompass
all forms of dilution recognized by the [state] courts.' H.R. REP. No. 104-30, at 8
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1035.
' See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade Related Intellectual Property,
Art. 16(3), reprinted in Mostert, supra note 54, at 108.
67 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The language of the statute was
adopted almost verbatim from proposed language from the Trademark Review Commis-
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Moreover, the statute defines "dilution" as the "lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services" even in the absence of competition between the parties
and even if there is no likelihood of "confusion, mistake, or
deception."68
The House Report that accompanied the bill cited four reasons
for the legislation. It pointed out that famous marks are generally
used nationwide, and the current "patch-quilt" protection afforded
by state statutes was insufficient to protect marks that have such
wide geographic use.69 Similarly, the report noted that many state
courts were unwilling to issue nationwide injunctions in dilution
actions due to the fact that half of the states had no dilution stat-
utes.7" If a state judge were to limit an injunction to the immediate
state, the owner of a famous mark would be forced to bring a sepa-
rate dilution action in each state which had a dilution statute where
dilution was occurring.
The House report also noted that the TRIPS portion of GATT
gave protection to famous marks.7 By passing federal legislation
which offers dilution protection to famous marks, the United States
would make its domestic policies consistent with its international
obligations under GATT and the Paris Convention.72 Finally, the
House acknowledged that a dilution law would help the executive
branch to negotiate stronger protection for famous marks owned by
United States companies which are used in other countries.73 Oth-
er countries would be "reluctant to change their laws to protect fa-
mous U.S. marks if the U.S. itself does not afford special protection
for such marks."74
sion of the United States Trademark Association (now the International Trademark Associ-
ation). See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 455. The influence of the TRC Report extend-
ed beyond the crafting of the ultimate language of the statute. All of the reasons for the
legislation cited in the congressional history came from the TRC Report except for the
need to make U.S. trademark law consistent with our international obligations. Since the
TRC Report was drafted before TRIPS was enacted, the international rationale was less
pressing at the time.
6 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
69 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
70 See id. at 3-4.
1, See id. at 4.
72 See id.
' See id.
74 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
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The language of the federal statute is very similar to that of the
MSTB. One of the notable differences, however, is that the federal
statute applies only to famous marks," whereas under the MSTB, a
mark just had to be distinctive. The proposers of the statute be-
lieved only a "limited category" of marks deserved national protec-
tion due to their enormous value and the ease with which they
could be irreparably harmed by "promiscuous use."76 Thus, nation-
wide dilution protection created a broad zone of exclusivity around
a mark, limiting protection to famous marks in nationwide use be-
cause of their particular susceptibility to irreparable injury.7
To guide the courts, the federal law provides eight suggested
factors for courts to consider to determine whether a mark is
famous." The factors are:
A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels
of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register."
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that his mark is famous, he must then
show that dilution is or will be caused through defendant's use of
the mark.8"
's See 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
76 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 455.
77 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 455. The House Report noted that state laws
would still be available to protect marks that are only regionally famous as the federal
statute does not pre-empt state statutes. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprint-
ed in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
See id.
'o See id.
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II. ANALYSIS-APPLICATION OF THE FAME FACTORS BY THE COURTS
Some courts have paid little attention to the requirement that
the plaintiff in a dilution action must prove ownership of a famous
mark. No benchmark exists; fame must be determined on a case by
case basis.81 In numerous opinions, however; the determination of
fame has been disposed of in little more than a sentence or two.
8 2
These opinions lack a comprehensive discussion of whether a mark
is truly famous or not.83 Thus, some courts are giving short shrift to
the fame requirement despite Congress' intention that only a small
group of marks be protected by the dilution law.
Other courts are misunderstanding the meaning of the various
factors comprising the fame analysis. Once again, the courts are
operating without an appreciation for the importance Congress
placed on certain fame factors set forth in the limited legislative
history. This is partly due to the fact that since fame is to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis, each factor is stated in general,
equivocal terms. Such general language gives courts little guidance
as to the degree to which a certain factor or set of factors must be
present in order for a mark to be famous. Too often, courts will
simply find fame by noting that a single factor is present or a combi-
nation of factors exist rather that considering the degree to which
each factor is present.84 In order to make a well grounded determi-
nation of fame, however, courts must carefully interpret the fame
factors in light of legislative intent. They should carefully discuss the
degree to which various factors are present and the weight each
factor receives in the final determination. This type of analysis
11 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 460.
82 See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479,
1480 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding fame because the Candyland trademark has been
registered since 1951); Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1631 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(finding fame because Wawa is fanciful, not descriptive, used extensively in its industry
and extensively advertised). Even if a court wishes to take judicial notice of the fame
of a mark or if the parties stipulate to its fame in an effort to save time and expense,
the court should explain the basis for those actions.
' See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Andy's Sportswear Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542
(N.D. Cal. 1996); Hasbro Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1479. This does not imply that the
fame determinations in these cases are incorrect. It only suggests that since Congress
intended for the statute to apply to a very limited group of marks, a greater explanation
by the courts of why a certain mark qualifies would be helpful during the nascent stag-
es of this statute, until the judiciary reduces some of the vagueness and confusion sur-
rounding the statute.
4 See, e.g., Hasbro Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1479.
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would result in decisions which not only better effect the legislative
intent but also provide valuable guidance for other courts and
trademark lawyers.
A. The Degree of Inherent or Acquired Distinctiveness of the
Mark"
Marks which are descriptive of the goods or services they iden-
tify cannot be registered as trademarks.86 If, through use, the mark
becomes distinctive of the user's goods, it can then be registered. 7
Distinctiveness, therefore, is the threshold requirement for registra-
tion of a mark. As originally drafted, the dilution statute applied
only to 'famous registered marks." 8 Since distinctiveness is a re-
quirement for registration, Congress intended that famous marks
were more than just distinctive. If mere distinctiveness was the
requirement, "famous" would have been superfluous, and no fame
factors would have been required.89
To be diluted, a mark must first have a high degree of distinc-
tiveness.9" Distinctiveness in the dilution context requires that the
mark retain its source significance outside of the normal use of the
mark.91 A determination of the degree of distinctiveness is tanta-
mount to a determination of the fame of a mark.92
Since Congress drafted the statute to apply only to famous
marks and not just distinctive marks, federal courts should require a
threshold finding that the mark is highly distinctive despite the fact
that it is just a suggested factor.93 Distinctiveness, rather than fame,
15 U.S.C. § 1127(c)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1994).
87 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). The mark is said to have acquired distinctiveness or
secondary meaning. See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 15:15.
18 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1031.
'9 See Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878) (the legislature is pre-
sumed to have used no superfluous words when drafting statutes); In re Nantucket, Inc.,
677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
go See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cmt. e (1995); see also
H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (en-
dorsing the view of dilution as the debilitation of the "potency' of a mark) (emphasis
added).
9' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cmt. e (1995).
92 See MCCARTHY, supra note 7 § 24:92.
9' Thus far, most courts have grounded their findings of fame in a high degree of
distinctiveness. See Sunbeam Products Inc. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545,
1551 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (finding inherently distinctive trade dress); Intermatic Inc. v.
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was the requisite factor for protection under the MSTB and most
state dilution statutes.94 Congress, however, chose to make fame
the required showing to be entitled to protection.9" Therefore,
more than mere distinctiveness is necessary.
The courts have recognized a high level of distinctiveness in a
wide variety of contexts. In Augusta National, Inc. v Sir Christopher
Hatton, Inc., the court found that "Augusta," though not inherently
distinctive, had acquired a high degree of distinctiveness to qualify
as a famous mark in the context of golf.96 The court's finding of ac-
quired distinctiveness was attributed to the long, continuous use of
the mark by the plaintiff and the "unceasing efforts of ... its em-
ployees and volunteers" to promote the mark for annual tourna-
ments and services." Although not explicitly stated, the high level
of acquired distinctiveness was the major factor in the court's
characterization of "Augusta" as a famous mark.
In addition to acquired distinctiveness, courts may base a deter-
mination of fame on a finding that a mark is inherently distinctive.
In Toys "R" Us Inc. v. Akkaoui, the court found that the "inherent
peculiarity" of the "R Us" family of marks contributed to a finding
of fame.98
Trademarks which lack a high level of acquired or inherent
distinctiveness, however, should be precluded from obtaining relief
under the statute. In Petro Shopping Center , L.P. v. James River
Petroleum, the court found that the plaintiff's mark was not famous
because it did not have the requisite distinctiveness to constitute a
famous mark.99 The mark was neither inherently distinctive nor
Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. III. 1996); Toys 'R' Us Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 (N.D. Cal. 1996); cf. Hasbro Inc. v. Internet Entertainment
Group Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1480 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (relying only on federal
registration of the mark and length of use by plaintiff).
1 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
9' See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1846 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
91 Id. at 1847. This reasoning also incorporates factors (B) the extent and duration of
use of the mark, (Q the duration for the service with which the mark is used, and (F)
the degree of recognition of the mark within its trading area. This reflects how many of
the factors are interrelated, as fame is generally due to a combination of factors.
40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1853, 1855 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd 130 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 1561 (1998); see also Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally Accessories,
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. II1. 1997) (finding plaintiffs "WEATHER GUARD" mark not
sufficiently distinctive and thus, not famous).
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had it acquired distinctiveness through a secondary meaning.'"
The court rightfully ended its inquiry of fame at that point.101 Un-
less the mark has a high level of distinctiveness, it cannot be
famous.
Analysis under this factor must avoid confusing mere distinc-
tiveness with fame. An inherently distinctive mark is not necessarily
a famous mark. 2 It would be unusual, however, to find a mark
that is famous but not distinctive.'03 Put another way, all famous
marks will be distinctive, but all distinctive marks will not be fa-
mous. This observation was made by a Florida District Court in
Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Sciences, Corp.1"4 The court
pointed out that while distinctiveness was sufficient to entitle a
mark to protection under the Florida statute, the federal statute
required a greater showing to be famous and entitled to dilution
protection ."
In Clinique Laboratories, Inc. v. DEP Corporation, the court
confused a determination of distinctiveness for a determination of
fame. 0" Earlier, the court had determined that the plaintiff's trade-
mark and trade dress were distinctive for the purposes of infringe-
ment protection. 7 Turning to the dilution question, the court re-
cited the statutory factors for fame but mistakenly said that the same
factors were relevant to a determination of whether a mark is "dis-
tinctive or famous."0 8 The Clinique court noted that since the
plaintiff's mark was sufficiently distinctive under federal trademark
infringement and trade dress infringement law, the plaintiff's marks
"are distinctive for the purposes of Section 43(c) [the dilution stat-
ute] as well."0 9 The court failed to recognize that distinctiveness
is but one factor in the determination of fame, and distinctiveness
alone does not constitute fame." 0 When courts similar to the
'00 See 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1855.
101 See id.
102 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 460.
103 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 460.
104 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
105 See id. at 1998.
106 945 F. Supp. 547, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
107 See id. at 551, 559.
11o Id. at 561.
IO Id.
110 In fairness to the court, a proper consideration of the fame factors would have un-
doubtedly reached the same result. Clinique has been in use for approximately 30 years;
its skin care products are distributed to department stores, specialty stores and drug
stores; and it sold approximately $2 billion of its skin care products in the United States
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Clinique court rely on precedent from federal infringement law,
they must be careful to observe the carefully drawn differences
between the federal dilution statute and other statutes. Improper
reliance on infringement case law to address dilution questions
creates poor precedent and leads to greater uncertainty as to what
constitutes a famous mark.
B. The Duration and Extent of Use of the Mark in Connection with
the Goods or Services with which the Mark is Used."'
The second factor in the fame analysis-duration and extent of
use-like the others, is drawn in general, equivocal terms. The stat-
ute gives no indication as to the duration of time a mark have to be
in use in order to be considered famous. The House Report and the
TRC Report note that, generally, famous marks "will have been in
use for some time."' 2 From the language of the statute, the legis-
lative history and the TRC Report, it is clearly difficult to surmise
what length of use indicates that a mark may be famous. This factor
may be a pragmatic one for making case-by-case determination.
However, over time the lack of direction will leave the judiciary
open to attack for making inconsistent decisions. While a determi-
nation of fame is often grounded upon a multitude of factors, one
can easily envision an equal period of use aiding a determination of
fame in one instance and damaging it in another. If a mark has been
in use for 5-10 years, reasonable individuals can differ as to
whether that period would tilt in favor of or against a finding of
fame.
Inconsistent judicial findings on this factor are likely to confuse
and mislead those seeking to use potentially diluting marks on other
products. If similar periods of use lead to different determinations of
fame, those seeking to advise clients as to whether use of a particu-
lar mark is likely to create liability under the dilution statute will
have little guidance. Trademark counsel is already handicapped by
between 1991 and 1995. See id. at 549.
It' 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
:12 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1034.; TRC Report, supra note 21, at 460.
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the lack of a register for famous marks." 3 If objective criteria is
able to cause opposite results in similar circumstances, trademark
counsel is able to give advice with even less certainty.
Thus far, courts have considered marks as old as 125 years" 4
and as young as 15 years"' to be famous marks. In one case, the
fact that a mark had been in use for only 9 years weighed heavily
against a determination that the mark was famous. 1 6 In this age of
rapid nationwide distribution and extensive advertising budgets,
however, it is not unlikely that a mark could achieve a high degree
of renown in just 9 years. The TRC Report recognized that certain
marks will become famous overnight through heavy publicity and
advertising." '7 Thus, while a determination of fame should be a
contextual one and should not rely on any one factor,"' the ques-
tionable nature of the duration factor creates the possibility of
similar objective facts creating different results.
Another potential danger of the legislature drawing the fame
factors in such equivocal terms is the possibility of courts using the
factor incorrectly to bolster a poor decision. There have been two
cases where the courts reached somewhat specious determinations
of fame. The number of years in which the marks had been in use
was a factor used to bolster both decisions. In Wawa Inc. v. Haaf,
the court granted an injunction to the plaintiff based partially on the
fact that the plaintiff had been using its mark for nearly 90
years." 9 Although Wawa owned over 500 convenience stores in
five states and had an annual advertising budget of over
$6,000,000,120 Wawa's mark did not enjoy nationwide fame
which would have entitled it to protection under the federal
dilution statute.' 2'
113 See Current Commentary on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 87
TRADEMARK REP. 490, 496 (1997) (comments of J. Thomas McCarthy).
114 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D. Va. 1997). "The Greatest Show On Earth" has con-
tinuously been in use by Ringling Bros. since 1872.
11' See Teletech Customer Care Management (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F.
Supp. 1407, 1408 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
116 See Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc., 939 F. Supp 340, 350
(D.N.J. 1996) (The "plaintiff's mark is not famous and [is] unworthy of protection . ...
The slogan has only been used . . . for nine years.").
,,7 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 460.
118 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 460.
119 See 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1631 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
120 See id. at 1631.
121 See Section Il.D., infra discussing Congress' intent to limit the extraordinary reme-
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Similarly, in Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., the
court granted relief to the plaintiff who operated a chain of weekly
newspapers almost exclusively in a single Maryland county.'22
One of the plaintiff's newspapers circulated in one additional
Maryland county.'23 The defendant operated solely in one of the
same Maryland counties.'24 The court engaged in a twisted analy-
sis to determine that "Gazette" is not a generic word.'25 It then
noted that the plaintiff's use of "Gazette" since 1957 "bolsters the
meaning of the name" which entitles plaintiff's mark to protection
as a famous mark.'26
Decisions such as Wawa and Gazette Newspapers threaten to
undermine the legislative goal of strengthening the hand of the
executive branch to negotiate strong protection for famous
American marks. Congress passed the dilution statute to bring
United States law into line with our obligations under international
treaties, which provide special protection to famous marks, and to
strengthen the hand of the executive branch to negotiate stronger
rights for famous American marks in overseas markets. 27 The
House specifically noted that other countries will be unlikely to
give marks owned by United States companies special protection if
the United States does not give such protection to its own
marks.'28 If American courts continue to grant extraordinary pro-
tection to non-famous marks, other countries may be unwilling to
dy available under the dilution statute to nationally famous marks and for locally famous
marks, to continue to bring actions under state dilution statutes.
'12 934 F. Supp. 688, 690 (D. Md. 1996).
1" See id.
124 See id. at 691.
1 See id. at 693-94 (reasoning that Webster's dictionary defines "gazette" as a news-
paper, but the definition of "newspaper" does not include the word "gazette.'). In Ga-
zette, it appeared that the defendant intentionally chose the name "Gazette" for his
newspaper in the hope of enticing the plaintiff to buy his operation. See id. at 692. It
appears that defendant's bad faith motivated the court to find a way to grant the plain-
tiff relief. If the plaintiff's mark was only generic, he would not have been entitled to
an injunction. See id. Despite the intention of the court to reach an equitable result, the
published decision sets an extremely low threshold for a finding of fame. As such, it is
poor precedent for future courts.
126 See id. at 695-97. sadly this court confused a determination of fame for a deter-
mination of dilution itself. In footnote six of the opinion it stated, "To determine wheth-
er trademark dilution has occurred: a court may consider factors such as, but not limited
to . . . ." and then proceeded to list the statutory factors to determine fame. Id. at 696-
97 n.6 (emphasis added).
127 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
125 See id.
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grant similar protection to famous American marks. Declaring a
mark famous creates a broad zone of exclusivity around the mark,
prohibiting others from using it even in the absence of confusion. If
the courts apply the statute too broadly, it will create concerns in
nations with developing economies about the statute tipping the
balance between fair competition and property rights too sharply in
favor of vesting trademark owners with a property right.
Since the duration of use factor has the potential to lead to
inconsistent judicial decision-making and can be used to bolster
poorly considered determinations, courts should give minimal con-
sideration to this factor. Determinations of fame should instead be
grounded in those factors which are more indicative of the mark's
national reputation. In a close case, the courts may want to consider
the past use of the mark over multiple generations to tip the balance
in favor of a finding of fame.
C. The Duration and Extent of Advertising and Publicity of the
Mark129
The third statutory factor-the duration and extent of advertis-
ing and publicity of the mark"3 -- requires the court to consider
the efforts the owner of the mark has made to notify others of the
existence of its mark. This factor reflects Congress' recognition of
the "substantial investment" that famous mark owners ordinarily
make in promoting their marks and the products and services that
accompany them.' The statute rewards mark owners that have
invested heavily in promoting their unique identifiers by enjoying
others seeking to trade on the good name established by the famous
mark.
This third factor should not be relied upon heavily by the
courts in their determinations of fame. Similar to the duration of
use factor discussed supra, the duration of promotion factor suffers
from the possibilities of misuse. Because this factor evaluates objec-
tive numbers, it is possible for different fame determinations to be
made for different marks which have similar levels of advertising.
For example, in Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., the court found
the plaintiff's mark not famous despite the fact that $30 million was
129 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
1 9 See id.
131 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
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spent over the prior decade promoting the mark.132 Fortunately,
the court did a factor-by-factor analysis before balancing all of the
factors. The court found that the level of advertising favored a find-
ing of fame; however, the court properly gave more emphasis to
other factors which are more indicative of fame.133 Similarly, in
Teletech Customer Care Management (California), Inc. v. Tele-Tech
Co., Inc., the court based its finding of fame, in part, on the
plaintiff's "extensive" advertising.' This plaintiff, however, spent
less than $1 million in the previous year promoting its mark.35
Although both courts found that the different levels of advertis-
ing costs favored the plaintiffs in each case, the opposite fame deter-
minations make it more difficult for practitioners to advise clients as
to whether a mark in existence is famous and thus, protected by a
broad zone of exclusivity. Practitioners, like the courts, should place
little emphasis on this factor when advising clients.
Moreover, similar to this Note's discussion in the previous
section addressing the duration of use factor, the level of advertising
can be used by the courts to bolster a poorly made decision. In the
Gazette Newspapers and Wawa decisions, each court cited the
level of the plaintiff's advertising as a reason for finding that its
mark was famous. 6 Since neither mark was used across a sub-
stantial portion of the United States, no finding of fame should have
been made. This factor should not be considered until it is estab-
lished that the mark is used in a "substantial portion of the
U.S.
137
D. The Geographical Extent of the Trading Area in which the Mark
is Used
The fourth statutory factor-the geographical extent of the
trading area in which the mark is used 38--is one of the most im-
portant of the suggested factors set forth by the statute. The House
132 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1034 (D. Haw. 1996).
13 See id. at 1036.
13 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
131 See id. at 1409.
'36 See Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688, 691 & n.3
(D. Md. 1996); Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1631 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (annual
advertising of $6 million).
137 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1034.
"3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(D) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
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Report reiterates three times the fact that the statute is intended to
cover only marks that are famous on a nationwide basis.'39 More-
over, the section of the Report entitled "Background and Need for
the Legislation," unequivocally states that the "statute is necessary
because famous marks ordinarily are used on a nationwide
basis."'
140
Later in the same section, the House Report tacitly reiterates its
intention that the law be used to protect only nationally famous
marks.' 4' The Report notes that the federal statute does not pre-
empt state statutes. 42 It then states that "[s]tate laws could contin-
ue to be applied in cases involving locally famous or distinctive
marks." 43 The same section also points out that unlike patent and
copyright law, for which Congress has a constitutional grant of
power, 44  federal trademark laws coexist with state trademark
laws.14' As earlier versions of federal trademark legislation had
been declared unconstitutional,'46 Congress was aware of the
need to avoid overstepping its constitutional powers. 47
The House Report's "Section-by-Section Analysis" states that the
"geographical extent" factor means that "[tihe geographic fame of
the mark must extend throughout a substantial portion of theU.S." 48 In addition, although no Senate Report accompanied the
bill, Senator Hatch noted on the floor of the Senate during delibera-
tions on the bill that it was intended only to cover marks that were
famous on a "nationwide basis." 149 The emphasis on nationwide
fame in the House Report and the accompanying remarks on the
Senate floor demonstrate that the legislature only intended for the
dilution statute to apply to nationally famous marks. Congress'
139 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3, 4, 7, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030, 1031, 1034.
'4 See id. at 3.
141 See id. at 4.
141 See id.
143 See id. at 4.
14 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
141 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
" See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
147 The defendants' marks in Gazette Newspapers, Inc. and Wawa Inc. were not used
in interstate commerce. See 934 F. Supp. 688, 691 (D. Md. 1996) (newspaper published
in one county); 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1631 (E.D. 1996) (one convenience store in Penn-
sylvania). Accordingly, the use of the federal statute was improper. See McCARTHY, supra
note 7, § 24:89.
148 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 7, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1034.
149 See 141 CONG. REC. S19,310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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failure to give this factor more weight in the language of the statute
is unfortunate in light of its importance in the legislative history. No
mark should be able to obtain relief under the federal statute in the
absence of a showing that the mark enjoys renown over the vast
majority of the United States.
The inclusion of the geographical extent of the use of the mark
in such vague terms in the statute has led some courts to grant relief
in cases where Congress undoubtedly intended for state laws to be
the sole remedy, curbing any damage to the senior mark through
dilution. As previously discussed, the Gazette Newspapers and
Wawa marks were deemed famous despite their limited geographic
reach."' 0 Moreover, although the mark in Genovese Drug Stores,
Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc. was deemed not famous on other grounds,
the fact that the mark was in use in only three states should have
precluded a finding a fame.'
E. The Channels of Trade for the Goods or Services with which the
Mark is Used
The fifth factor-the channels of trade for the goods or services
with which the mark is usedS 2-- is an indicator of the breadth of
the use of the mark. In the TRC's proposal of the statute, it is sug-
gested that if the senior user's mark moves in a great number of
channels of trade, it will be easier for the court to infer that the
mark is famous. The court can then grant protection without actual
proof that a certain number of people actually know of the senior
mark.'53 A finding by the court that the goods are used in chan-
nels of trade likely to make the good known to a broad section of
the public would dispense with the need for the plaintiff to rely on
survey evidence to prove that its mark is famous due to its
recognition by a substantial number of people. 4
i See supra Sections ll.B. and II.C.
ISI 939 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D.N.J. 1996) (plaintiff owns stores in New York, New Jer-
sey and Connecticut).
..2 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(E) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 461.
1 One commentator has expressed doubts about the ability to use survey evidence
in the dilution context. See Current commentary on the Federal Dilution Act, 87 TRADE-
MARK REP. 490, 493 (1997) (comments of Harvey Perlman); see also Bencivenga, supra
note 2 (discussing the lack of authority regarding survey evidence proving dilution).
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Often famous marks are used in a variety of contexts which
makes this factor a helpful indicator of fame. In Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen, the court rendered a determination
of fame, noting that Panavision directs its advertising to the general
public, companies in the entertainment industry and targeted indi-
viduals within that industry."'5 American Express' use of its "Don't
Leave Home Without It" mark in the fields of travel, charge servic-
es, traveler's checks, tours and reservations also aided a determina-
tion that the mark was famous." 6 The greater the number of chan-
nels in which, the mark is used, the more likely that the mark will
be considered well-known, famous and eligible for dilution
protection.
F. The Degree of Recognition of the Mark in the Trading Areas and
Channels of Trade Used by the Mark's Owner and the Person
Against Whom the Injunction is Sought
The sixth factor is more an indicator that dilution is likely to
occur or that the junior user acted in bad faith than it is an indicator
of fame. This factor requires the court to consider the renown of the
senior mark within its own market and the market for the goods of
the junior user." 7 The court must look at the channels of trade for
the two marks and make a determination as to whether the senior
mark enjoys renown in both markets to the extent that the junior
use could lead those in its market to associate its goods with the
goods of the senior user.58
Under this factor, the fame determination should rest solely on
a mark's renown, or "degree of recognition," within its own market.
Once fame has been determined, the comparative factor should
then be used by the courts to decide whether dilution is likely. The
comparative portion of the factor has often been erroneously con-
sidered a factor to determine the threshold issue of whether the
945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
15 See American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 315 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
see also Toys "R' Us Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(finding that the plaintiff advertises its "products through a variety of channels [of trade]
both locally and nationally.').
117 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 460-61.
1 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 460-61.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UN-
FAIR COMPETITION § 25(1) (1995) (liability results "if the actor uses such a designation in
a manner that is likely to associate the other's mark with the goods, services, or busi-
ness of the actor.').
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senior mark is famous. In fact, it is a better indicator of whether
dilution is likely to occur. Any determination of whether a mark is
famous or not should not rest on a comparison of the channels of
trade in which two competing marks are used. Pursuant to TRIPS, a
mark famous within its own industry should be entitled to protec-
tion from dilution."5 9 Of course, if that mark has no renown in the
junior user's channels of trade, it is unlikely that dilution will occur
since those customers will be unlikely to associate the junior user's
products with the senior mark. Still, such analysis is separate and
independent of whether the determination as to a mark is famous or
not.
In fact, a high level of recognition of the senior mark in the
junior user's market indicates bad faith more than fame. The pres-
ence of this combination of factors makes it more likely then not
that the junior user knew of the senior mark and sought to profit
from its good name. 60 A determination that the defendant willful-
ly intended to act in bad faith is not only more pertinent to the
question of whether dilution occurred but also to whether damages
are available to the plaintiff. 6 '
When conducting a fame analysis, courts typically talk about
this factor simply in terms of the level of recognition of the senior
mark within its own markets. Any comparative discussion concern-
ing the markets for the parties' products usually only arises if the
court is seeking to determine whether dilution is likely to occur. For
example, although no evidence exists in the record demonstrating
the renown of the plaintiff's slogan, the American Express court
concluded that the mark was widely recognized throughout the
world.'62 However, when subsequently determining whether dilu-
tion was likely, the court found that the defendant's product was
completely different from American Express' making an occurrence
of dilution unlikely.'63 Similarly, the Panavision court limited its
See Article 16(3) of TRIPS, reprinted in Mostert, supra note 54, at 108.
,6o See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 460.
262 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (providing that damages and
attorney's fees are available to the plaintiff where the defendant "willfully intended to
trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark.").
162 See 947 F. Supp. 310, 315 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
16 See id. at 318. The court considered the differences between the products in its
analysis of whether dilution was likely to occur after determining that American Express'
mark was famous. This factor was adopted from a federal judge's interpretation of New
York's dilution statute which listed six factors to consider to determine whether dilution
was likely. See id. at 317 (citing Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
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analysis under this factor to the fact that the plaintiff's mark ap-
peared at the end of films and television shows on a daily basis and
that the plaintiff was a major source of photographic equip-
ment.'4 Likewise, in Star Markets, Ltd., the court found a high
degree of recognition of the plaintiff's mark in its channels of trade,
but the plaintiff's one-state geographic reach defeated a finding of
nationwide fame.'65
Each of these courts correctly limited their fame determination
under this factor to the degree of renown of the plaintiff's mark in
its own channels of trade. To extend the analysis to the mark's
renown in the junior user's channels of trade prematurely considers
the merits of whether dilution is likely before fame has been
conclusively determined.
G. "The Nature and Extent of Use of the Same or Similar Marks by
Third Parties" 66
The seventh factor-the nature and extent of use of the same or
similar marks by third parties-hinges on a determination of the
exclusivity of the senior mark.167 The TRC Report recommended
that the mark at issue "should be in substantially exclusive use."1' 68
Moreover, the court in Star Market, Ltd. cited the House Report to
make clear that this seventh factor involves the use of similar marks
even in noncompeting industries.169  Dilution protection, as op-
Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring)). The Mead Data test
has been very influential in federal courts since the passage of the federal law. See,
e.g., Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937
F. Supp. 204, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1632
(E.D. Pa. 1996); Clinique Lab., Inc. v. DEP Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
'6 See 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("Filmed With Panavision" was
seen during the credits of many productions). The court did not engage in a compar-
ative analysis of the products or channels of trade between the parties. In this case the
defendant obtained the rights to the Internet domain name "www.panavision.com' and
demanded $13,000 from the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to use the name. Id. at 1300.
The court found that the defendant's registration of the name prevented the plaintiff from
using its marks on the Internet, which diluted the marks. Id. at 1304.
" 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1035-36 (D. Haw. 1996) (plaintiff's business limited to Ha-
waii).
'1 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(G) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
167 Id.
'1 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 459.
169 950 F. Supp. at 1035 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030).
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posed to infringement protection, is designed to protect something
the public perceives as "unique, singular, or particular." 7' Thus, it
is unlikely that the exclusiveness or distinctiveness of a mark will be
blurred through another's use if third parties are already using the
same mark.
Accordingly, the Star Markets court refused to limit its consider-
ation of third party use to the plaintiff's industry.17' The court
noted that fifty food-related businesses in the Western United States
used the word "Star," including twenty-three retail grocery
stores.'72 Moreover, over ninety businesses in Hawaii used "Star"
in their names.'73 Lastly, eight similar stores had federally regis-
tered trademarks with the word "Star" in them, including another
"Star Markets."' 74 As a result, the court found such evidence
weighed heavily against a finding that the plaintiff's mark was
famous. 7 '
Evidence weighing in favor of a finding of fame based upon
exclusivity may be established in plaintiff's legal efforts to preserve
the exclusivity of their marks. The Toys 'R" Us and American
Express courts pointed out that each plaintiff had a history of pre-
venting others from using its marks. The Toys "R" Us court referred
to the extensive litigation the company engaged in to protect its
marks. 7 In American Express, the plaintiff's pleadings indicated a
history of success at preventing unauthorized use of its mark. 77
Thus, when seeking such an extraordinary equitable remedy, if a
plaintiff can show that it has gone to extensive efforts to preserve
the exclusivity of its mark, the court will be more likely to find that
it is entitled to relief.'78
170 Id.
17t Id.
172 Id. at 1036.
173 Id.
174 950 F. Supp. at 1036.
", Id.; see also King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 968 F. Supp.
568, 578 (D. Col. 1997) (defendant's presentation of "copious' evidence of third party
uses of "King of the Mountain" precludes a finding that plaintiff's mark is famous);
Sports Authority, Inc. v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 925, 941 (E.D. Mich.
1997) ("current third-party use of [the mark] ... [wihether or not it is in the [plaintiff's]
market ...diminishes any 'distinctive or famous' aspects of [the mark].").
176 See 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
177 See 947 F. Supp. 310, 315 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
17 The American Express court did not grant relief on plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 319. The court ruled that there were genuine issues of material fact on
a number of the factors it considered to determine whether dilution was likely. Id. at
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
The exclusivity of a mark can be an indication of fame because
it helps to indicate the distinctiveness of a mark.179 Sometimes,
however, a mark should be declared famous, despite extensive third
party use. In such instances, the exclusivity of a mark is more prop-
erly an indicator of whether dilution is likely to occur. As Trustees
of Columbia University v. ColumbiaHCA Healthcare Corp. demon-
strated, a mark may be world famous, but third party use can indi-
cate that dilution is unlikely.' In Trustees of Columbia
University, plaintiff's nationally famous Ivy League university hospi-
tal sought to enjoin a nationally famous health care provider from
using the name "Columbia."' 8' The court found that the distinc-
tiveness of the plaintiff's mark was already undermined by third
party use of the word "Columbia."' Specifically, the ubiquitous
nature of the "Columbia" name, even in the healthcare industry,
was a strong indicator that those in the market for the defendant's
services were unlikely to associate Columbia University with the
defendant's services.'83 The plaintiff's mark should have been
found famous based on the hospital's reputation as one of "the most
distinguished centers for medical education in the United
States."'84 The use of the mark by third parties should not have
altered that determination. The extensive use of "Columbia" by third
parties, however, was indicative that dilution was unlikely to
occur.
85
318 (genuine issue as to similarity of the products covered by the marks, sophistication
of plaintiff's consumers and the predatory intent of the defendant).
179 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. e at 268 (1995). If the
mark is exclusive, it is more likely to retain its significance as a source indicator outside
the context of its market and thus indicate fame. If others use the same mark in other
contexts, the mark is less likely to retain such significance.
180 964 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
18 Id.
182 Id. at 749. This court, like others discussed above, confused distinctiveness with
fame. The court held that the "determination whether a mark is famous and distinctive
[for dilution protection] is similar to the analysis . .. for trademark infringement purpos-
es.' Id. The court cited Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
875 F.2d 1026, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989), for support. Mead Data, however, interpreted the
New York dilution statute, which only requires that the trademark be distinctive and
established. See id. at 1028.
183 964 F. Supp. at 750. The court accepted the representations of the defendant's
founder that he chose "Columbia" because it "sounded positive and national in scope."
Id. at 739.
11 Id. at 737.
18 Id. at 750. For the final result, it would appear to matter little whether the court
considers third party usage during the fame determination or during a determination on
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Among the many problems with the court's decision in Gazette
Newspapers is its dismissal of the fact that third parties used the
"Gazette" name extensively.186  The defendant argued that
"Gazette" was being used by others in the same geographical re-
gion; however, the court limited its consideration to the two coun-
ties in which the plaintiff operated. 87 A cursory search of the
Lexis Directory of Services shows that at least seven major newspa-
pers around the country use Gazette in the title. 88 The extraor-
dinary remedy provided by Congress in the federal statute creates a
broad zone of exclusivity around famous marks. 89 Congress want-
ed to correct the patchwork coverage of state laws to protect fa-
mous trademarks which are worthy of protection nationally and
internationally. 9° The use of the federal statute to protect the
use of "Gazette" in only two counties in Maryland, however, when
many others are using the name across the country contradicts
congressional intent.
Whether courts use the seventh factor to determine the fame of
a mark or whether dilution is likely, it is important that all courts
perform a comprehensive analysis of this factor before finding that a
mark is diluted. Congress explicitly intended for the dilution statute
to protect marks that are "unique, singular, or particular." 91 It is
irresponsible for a court to grant an injunction under the statute to
protect a mark which does not carry a high degree of exclusivity.
H. Whether the Mark [is] Federally Registered'92
This final factor was initially a requirement under the proposed
statute rather than a suggested factor. 93 Limiting dilution protec-
tion to registered marks aimed to promote predictability 94 estab-
the merits. In order to provide valuable precedent, however, it is important for the
courts to provide clear, explanatory opinions upon which others can provide sensible
advice.
15 934 F. Supp. at 695.
187 Id.
10 See Lexis Directory of Services at 189-91 (1997).
'89 See McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:100.
190 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1930.
191 Id.
192 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(H) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
1 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 458; H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4, reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
191 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 457.
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lish prima facie evidence of distinctiveness,19 and promote regis-
tration of trademarks.'96 After the bill was introduced in the
House, however, it was amended to include protection for famous
unregistered marks so as to keep the law consistent with internation-
al obligations under the TRIPS portion of GA-T. 197
This factor should now have little weight in determining wheth-
er a mark is famous or not. Registration was required to show that,
at a minimum, the mark was distinctive.'98 Fame was to be proved
separately.'99 The TRC crafted the statute with the understanding
that famous marks comprised a small subset of all registered
marks.2" The fact that a mark is registered has little bearing on
whether a mark has the degree of distinctiveness necessary to
qualify as famous.2"'
In one decision, a Washington District Court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction to a plaintiff where the finding of fame rested on the
fact that plaintiff's mark had been registered since 1951.02 While
the plaintiff's mark was arguably famous, the court failed to consid-
er the other indicia of fame, despite the fact that Congress intended
for the dilution statute to protect a limited group of marks, and
legislative history clearly reveals that federal registration of a mark is
insufficient to prove fame.03
While other courts have mentioned federal registration of the
plaintiff's mark as a reason for finding fame, they appeared to place
little emphasis on this factor. In Panavision, the court listed federal
registration of the mark as a starting point for establishing fame
195 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 459. Only distinctive marks can be registered.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1998 Supp.); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 7, reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1034.
' See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 457.
,97 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1031.
19 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 459.
See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 459.
2 See TRC Report, supra note 21, at 455. ("a limited category of trademarks, those
which are truly famous and registered, are deserving of national protection from dilu-
tion . . . . We therefore urge the adoption of a highly selective federal dilution stat-
ute . . . . ) (emphasis added).
201 See McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:109.
202 See Hasbro Inc. v. Intemet Entertainment Group Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1480
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding that the defendant's use of the domain name 'www.candyla-
nd.com" to identify a sexually explicit web site is likely to dilute plaintiff's mark which
identifies a children's board game).
' See generally H.R. REP. No. 104-374, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1031. The
Report consistently refers to protection of 'famous marks' rather than registered marks.
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before discussing the other, more indicative, fame factors.2" In
Teletech, the court listed federal registration of the mark as an after-
thought to the facts which more accurately led to the conclusion
that the mark was famous.
205
Federal registration of a mark should be deleted from the feder-
al statute as a factor indicating the fame of a mark. Although most
courts place little emphasis on registration as an indicator as fame,
one court found that lack of federal registration counted against the
plaintiff in the determination of fame. The Star Markets court actual-
ly wrote that the absence of federal registration of the plaintiff's
mark favored the defendants.2°' The other fame factors may fit
well into a checklist "for" or "against" the plaintiff. Registration,
however, should only be considered as a minor benefit to the
plaintiff as prima facie evidence that the mark is distinctive. The
plaintiff should not be penalized if the mark is not registered. Doing
so would be inconsistent with our obligations under international
treaties to protect all famous marks whether they are registered or
not.2 7 The registration factor is present to assist courts to deter-
mine whether a mark is distinctive. It is of little assistance, at best,
and possibly confusing to the analysis of fame, since the first factor
in the fame analysis requires a finding that the mark has a high
degree of distinctiveness.0 8
CONCLUSION
Fortunately, only two decisions under the federal dilution stat-
ute reached clearly erroneous determinations that the plaintiff's
mark was famous.2 9 However, in a number of decisions where
the court appears to have reached a correct determination of fame,
the court has, in fact, reached its determination through an incorrect
or abbreviated analysis. Although fame is to be determined on a
case-by-case basis, these opinions will serve as precedent for future
See Hasbro, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1480.
201 See 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
206 See 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (D. Haw. 1996) ("Not owning a federal registration
of its mark . . . compels the court to find that this factor favors Defendants.') (emphasis
added).
207 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.
' See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 24:109.
' See Gazette Newspapers, 934 F. Supp. at 688; Wawa, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1629.
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courts that look for guidance to interpret this new statute."' Rely-
ing on poorly or incorrectly reasoned opinions could lead to incon-
sistencies in the relief similarly situated plaintiffs receive in the
federal courts.
More importantly, courts interpreting the federal dilution statute
should engage in a comprehensive analysis of each of the fame
factors. The factors should be discussed while keeping in mind
Congress' intent to limit protection to a small group of marks that
are "unique, singular," marks that are potent, marks in which the
owner has made a "substantial investment ... in the mark," and
marks which carry an "aura.""1' The courts should also bear in
mind that the statute was intended to protect marks for which the
executive branch is seeking greater protection in overseas mar-
kets.2"2 If the courts apply the statute too broadly to marks that are
not truly famous on a nationwide basis, the bargaining strength of
United States trade negotiators will be undermined. Since the dilu-
tion statute carves out a broad zone of exclusivity around the mark,
foreign nations will be unwilling to grant such extraordinary rights
to a large number of marks for fear that such rights could hamper
free competition.
In the absence of a national register of famous marks, greater
judicial scrutiny of the fame factors with careful explanations of the
weight accorded to each factor will aid practitioners to determine
whether an existing mark is possibly a famous one. This will further
assist the practitioner to more accurately predict whether the use of
a mark in a non-competitive area is permissible.
Courts should not determine fame based on precedents from
other federal trademark laws. Courts which are considering mixed
infringement/dilution claims should be careful to separate their
analyses of mere distinctiveness under the infringement action from
the fame analysis under the dilution action where distinctiveness is
only one of many pertinent factors. Similarly, use of state law prece-
dent to determine fame is incorrect because marks are not required
to be famous under state dilution statutes. State statutes only require
a finding of distinctiveness which is insufficient to a finding of fame
under the federal statute.
210 See Star Markets, 950 F. Supp. at 1034 (noting that in Wawa, use of the mark in
only five states did not preclude the application of the statute).
211 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
212 See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1031.
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The lack of appellate decisions thus far has resulted in little
guidance to district courts and practitioners alike as to the proper
weight to be accorded the various fame factors. Until such guid-
ance arrives, the courts should carefully consider each factor in light
of Congressional intent to guarantee the mark in question is
deserving of dilution protection.
Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd

